Sales—Implied Warranty of Wholesomeness by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 28 Issue 4 
January 1943 
Sales—Implied Warranty of Wholesomeness 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sales—Implied Warranty of Wholesomeness, 28 WASH. U. L. Q. 287 (1943). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss4/8 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
lowing the rule that a certificate of judgment by a deputy is sufficient if
the presiding judge certifies that it is in due form of law, there is no need
for a clerk of court to personally sign the certificates.22
It is submitted that the principal case may be justified upon the desire
of our court to follow the national policy of re-employing all persons enter-
ing military service and all due consideration should be given to our fight-
ing forces. 2  M. E.
SALPs-IMPLIE WARRANTY Op WHoLEsoMENEsS--[Texas].-Plaintiff's
husband bought from a retail merchant some sausage commercially known
as "Cervelot." The manufacturer had advertised the sausage as being suit-
able for human consumption in the summer time. It was consumed soon
after the purchase by members of plaintiff's family; and as a result of
having eaten the sausage one child died and other members of the family
became seriously ill. Plaintiff, whose husband had died from other causes,
brought suit against the manufacturer for herself and as next friend for
those members of her family who became ill. The jury found that the
sausage, at the time of processing and manufacturing, was so contaminated
and poisonous as to be unfit for human consumption. The jury also found
that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was negligent. The Texas Dis-
trict Court and Court of Appeals gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held,
Affirmed. The manufacturer and vendor of sausage is liable to consumers
for injuries caused them by poisonous and contaminated substances in the
sausage at the time the manufacturer processed and sold the same, even
though the manufacturer was not negligent in the processing thereof. The
retailer of foods has an absolute duty to sell only wholesome food, and is
liable to the consumer for a breach of such duty when the latter relies
on the former in the selection of the food and has no opportunity to ex-
amine it. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps.,
In addition to possible remedies against the retailer, there being no
express warranty that the food is wholesome, there are two alternative
remedies against the manufacturer open to the injured consumer of food
sold for immediate human consumption. One is an action in tort for the
negligence of the manufacturer and the other is an action for breach of
sonally all judgments when he knows these are to be sued upon in other
states.
22. Stedman v. Patchin (1861) 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 218.
23. Selective Service Act (1940) 50 U. S. C. A. (Sec.) 308.
"(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such
training and service, has left or leaves a position, other than a tem-
porary position, in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives
such certificate, (2) is still qualified to perform the duties of such posi-
tion, and (3) makes application for reemployment within 40 days after
he is relieved from such training and service-
(C) if such position was in the employ of any State or political sub-
division thereof, it is hereby declared to be the sense of the Congress
that such person should be restored to such position or to a position of
like seniority, status, and pay."
1. (Texas 1942) 164 S. W. (2d) 828.
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an implied warranty of wholesomeness. Both actions require a breach of
a duty by the manufacturer to protect the consumer from injury, and injury
to the consumer as a result... of such breach.2 The tort action formerly
required privity with the manufacturer, 3 an exception being made in cases
where the article sold was inherently dangerous to human life and health.4
But today this exception to the requirement of privity has been extended
to include articles which may become dangerous to human life and health
if negligently prepared.5 Thus food for human consumption has been held
by the courts to be within this exception.6 The degree of cogency of negli-
gence necessary differs with the various American courts, some requiring
evidence of actual negligence, while others apply the doctrine that when
proof of unwholesomeness is shown, a prima facie case of negligence is
established. In those courts where a prima facie showing of negligence
is sufficient, some say that such a showing justifies an inference, while
others apply the doctrine of res ipsa loqitur. Although the tort action is
available to others than the purchaser-consumer because privity is not re-
quired, it utterly fails in cases such as the instant case where no negligence
can be shown on the part of the manufacturer. In the principal case the
Supreme Court of Texas held that there was a breach of an implied war-
ranty of wholesomeness of food sold for human consumption, and that the
warranty arose by operation ot law to protect the public health and
safety.7
At the present time the American courts are divided in their opinion
as to the nature of these warranties.8 A majority of the courts hold that
the action sounds in contract, the warranty arising by reason of the con-
tractual relationship; a minority group takes the view that the action
sounds in tort and the modern tendency is in this direction. As will be
seen, the majority rule does not follow the early English common law
theory of the nature of the implied warranty of food. An ancient English
criminal statute9 laid the foundation for the law of implied warranty of
wholesomeness in the sale of food for immediate human consumption, stat-
ing: "It is ordained that none shall sell corrupt victuals." In the first
2. Harper, A Treatise On The Law Of Torts (1st ed. 1933) 241, sec.
106.
3. Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 10 M. & W. 109; 152 Eng. Rep. 402.
This is the leading case for the doctrine that a manufacturer is not liable
for the injuries resulting from his negligence to a purchaser of his vendee.
4. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050.
5. Melick, The Sale Of Food And Drink (1936) 270.
6. Comment (1919) 7 Cal. Law Rev. 360; Comment (1935) 4 Fordham
Law Rev. 295; Comment (1933) 46 Harv. Law Rev. 530; Comment (1918)
27 Yale Law J. 1068.
7. Texas has not adopted a Sales Act, and chose to adopt the common
law rule of Illinois.
8. Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability To Persons Other Than Their
Immediate Vendees (1937) 24 Va. L. Rev. 134; Lessler, Implied Warranty
Of Quality In Sales Of Food (1940) 14 Conn. B. J. 47; Perkins, Unwhole-
some Food As A Source Of Liability (1920) 5 Ia. L. Bul. 6, 86.
9. Statute of Pillory and Tumbrel and of the Assize of Bread and Ale,
51 Hen. 3, stat. 6 (1266) 1 Stat. 47. The statute applied only to vintners,
brewers, butchers, and cooks.
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reported adjudication under this statute, the court allowed an action when
corrupt food had been sold.1o Early cases held that the vendor was under
such an absolute duty to sell wholesome victuals that lack of knowledge of
defects or any degree of care would be no justification." Blackstone de-
clared that action on the case for deceit was the widely used remedy.12
But in the latter half of the eighteenth century the action for warranty
declared in assumpsit came about"s as a matter of convenience to permit
the adding of the money counts14 and made possible the present diverse
positions of the courts.' 5 Thereafter the law of England was changed to
limit the implied warranty of wholesomeness in the sale of foods.16 The
earlier common law doctrine, however, was carried over to America and was
first effectively stated in New York in 1815 by the leading case of Van
Brcklin v. Fonda.17
Succeeding cases firmly established the existence of an implied warranty
of fitness of food for human consumption in sales by retail dealers and
allowed recovery in a wide variety of such cases.' s But after 1900 the New
10. Y. B. 9 Hen. 4, 53, B, where the defendant had sold unwholesome
wine to plaintiff. The defense was that there was no express warranty,
but the court (Babington, J.) held that an action on the case lay, even
though there was no express warranty, by effect of the Statute of Pillory
and Tumbrel and of the Assize of Bread and Ale.
11. In Keilway's Reports 91 (22 Hen. 7) 72 Eng. Rep. 254, the court
stated that no man can justify selling corrupt victual, but an action on
the case lies against the seller, whether the victual was warranted to be
good or not. The court further indicated in the opinion that the sale of
food was an exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor by saying that
knowledge was necessary in cases of merchandise, unless there was an
express warranty. In Roswel v. Vaughan (1607) Cro. Jac. 196, 79 Eng.
Rep. 171, 172, the court said: "But if a man sell victuals which is corrupt,
without warranty, an action lies, because it is against the commonwealth."
12. Blackstone stated: "In contracts for provisions, it is always implied
that they are wholesome; and if they be not, the same remedy (action on
the case for damages for deceit) may be had." 3 Blackstone Comm. sec.
166 (Lewis's ed.)
18. Williston declares that the law of warranty is a century older than
special assumpsit. But it should be remembered that the action of deceit,
which was the basis for the law of warranty, was several centuries older
than special assumpsit. See 1 Williston on Sales (2d ed. 1924) 368, sec. 195.
14. The first reported case was Stuart v. Wilkins (1778) 1 Doug. 18,
99 Eng. Rep. 15, where an action for breach of warranty declared in as-
sumpsit was allowed, predicated upon the contractual relation existing and
the failure of the seller to fulfill his implied promise or warranty. Mans-
field was hesitant to allow the action, but Buller, J. approved it, believing
that it had been previously practiced for many years.
15. See note 8, supra.
16. Parkinson v. Lee (1802) 2 East 315, 102 Eng. Rep. 389; Burnby v.
Bollett (1847) 16 N. & W. 644, 153 Eng. Rep. 1348; Emmerton v. Matthews
(1862) 7 H. & N. 586, 158 Eng. Rep. 604; Gardiner v. Gray (1815) 4 Camp.
144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46.
17. (1815) 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 468, Am. Dec. 339, in which case plaintiff
bought an unwholesome quarter of beef and recovered in the suit on the
theory of deceit. The case was decided on this theory, not breach of war-
ranty, but the dictum of the court plainly states that there was an implied
warranty of wholesomeness of food sold for domestic use.
18. Fairbank Canning Co. v. Metzger (1890) 118 N. Y. 260, 23 N. E.
19481
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York rule was modified to restrict application of the warranty to cases
involving a dealer who made or prepared the article he was selling, and
even then to situations in which the buyer had no opportunity to examine
the goods. 2o A majority of the courts followed the modified New York
rule; but several courts broadened this rule21 and extended the doctrine to
include other than retail dealers. In addition to the aforementioned mani-
foldness of the courts, they also differed as to whether the rule of caveat
venditor prevailed in the sale of food in original packages and in sealed
containers when the retailer had no knowledge of the contents. Again the
majority view followed the lead of the New York courts, 22 which had held
that caveat emptor applies in the absence of an express warranty. 23 But
Illinois established a clearer rule, holding that an implied warranty of
wholesomeness of canned goods exists under the common law.24 Some
recent decisions support the Illinois rule.25
372, 16 Am. St. Rep. 753 (beef sold that had been heated before being
killed); Sinclair v. Hathaway (1885) 57 Mich. 60, 23 N. W. 459, 58 Am.
Rep. 327 (bread sold to a distributor); Hoover v. Peters (1869) 18 Mich.
51 (farmer sold pork to a consumer directly for food); Divine v. Mc-
Cormick (1867) 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 116 (sale of a heifer for immediate con-
sumption) ; Race v. Krum (1918) 222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E. 853, L. R. A.
1918F, 1172 (ice cream sold in a drug store); Wiedeman v. Keller (1897)
171 Ill. 93, 49 N. E. 210 (retail dealer sold meats); Copas v. Provision
Co. (1889) 73 Mich. 541, 41 N. W. 690 (wholesale dealer sold ham to a
butcher).
19. Race v. Krum (1918) 222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E. 853, L. R. A. 1918
F, 1172.
20. 1 Williston on Sales (2d ed. 1924) 480, see. 242.
21. Hoover v. Peters (1869) 18 Mich. 51; Copas v. Provision Co. (1889)
73 Mich. 541, 41 N. W. 690.
22. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Gwilliams (1934) 189 Ark. 1037, 76
S. W. (2d) 65; Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Swilling (1933) 186 Ark. 1149,
57 S. W. (2d) 1029; Bigelow v. Maine Central R. R. Co. (1912) 110 Me.
105, 85 Atl. 396; Trafton v. Davis (1913) 110 Me. 318, 86 Atl. 179; Walden
v. Wheeler (1913) 153 Ky. 181, 154 S. W. 1088.
23. Julian v. Laubenberger (1896) 16 Misc. 646, 38 N. Y. S. 1052. In
this case the court said: "The law cannot be so unreasonable as to inject
into a contract what neither party had, or could have had, in mind at the
time the contract was made" (knowledge of condition of the article sold).
24. Chapman v. Roggenkamp (1913) 182 Ill. App. 117; Sloan v. F. W.
Woolworth Co. (1915) 193 Ill. App. 620. The Illinois courts founded this
rule on the absolute duty by early statute, saying that just because canned
goods were unknown when the rule was made was no reason for making
this exception. The argument that knowledge is essential is discredited as
contravening the rule at common law and placing the law of implied war-
ranty on the same basis as negligence. Had this argument been accepted,
there would be no liability for latent defects unless there was a special con-
tract to that end.
Ward v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. (1918) 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225,
5 A. L. R. 242, is the leading case refusing to make exception to the lia-
bility of the dealer on implied warranties in cases of canned goods. The
case was decided under the Massachusetts Sales Act but the court clearly
states that this was merely a codification of the common law as it previ-
ously existed in Massachusetts.
25. The California Supreme Court reversed an appellate decision which
followed the New York holding, and held that sales of canned goods are not
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss4/8
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The English Sale of Goods Act 28 was passed in 1893, supposedly to con-
solidate the existing law. But under the wording of the statute there no
longer exists the common law distinctiqn between the sale of food and the
sale of other goods, 27 and the common law distinction between sale by
manufacturer or grower and non-manufacturer or non-grower was also
abolished.28 The Uniform Sales Act,2 9 adopted in 31 states,30 is identical
in these respects to the English Act. Under section 15 (1) of this Act the
requirements for implied warranty of fitness for a specific purpose (better
termed 'wholesomeness' in cases of foods) include the buyer's express or
implied communication to the seller of the "particular purpose"a1 for
which the articles are required, and the buyer's reliance on the seller's
skill or judgment. Even when the purchase is that of canned goods,32 the
buyer of food for immediate human consumption still enjoys the implied
warranty of wholesomeness which he had under the common law provided
he can meet the above requirements.33 But even if these requirements can-
not be met, the buyer of food will have an implied warranty of mer-
chantable quality3 ' under section 15(2) of the Uniform Sales Act,3 5 which
an exception to the doctrine of caveat venditor. Gindraux v. Maurice Mer-
cantile Co. (1985) 4 Cal. (2d) 206, 47 P. (2d) 708, reversing Gindraux v.
Maurice Mercantile Co. (1934) 79 Cal. App. 291, 36 P. (2d) 844. Missis-
sippi held that the packer was liable, not the retailer, and that the war-
ranty ran to the consumer. Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling (1938) 165
Miss. 71, 145 So. 726.
26. 56 & 57 Vict. Ch. 71.
27. See sec. 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act.
28. See sec. 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act.
29. This Act was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1906, and recommended for enactment in all of
the American states.
80. The following states have not as yet adopted a Sales Act: Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, North Carolina, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
81. "Particular purpose" usually is distinguished from "general purpose"
in certain transactions, but in the purchase of food for immediate human
consumption it is not, as then normally both general and particular purpose
are to eat the food. Mere purchase of food is usually enough to give the
seller notice of the purpose for which it is purchased, since most food is
sold for immediate human consumption.
82. Under the Uniform Sales Act the retailer is liable for injury from
food sold in sealed containers-formerly the common law of only Illinois--
by reason of the historical past and the fact that the statute makes no
distinction concerning the subject matter of the sale.
88. Rinaldi v. Mohican Co. (1918) 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471, is fre-
quenty cited by the courts on this proposition.
84. In 1815 in England, Lord Ellenborough introduced merchantable
quality as an implied term. In Gardiner v. Gray (1815) 4 Camp. 144, 171
Eng. Rep. 46, he said that caveat emptor applied if there was opportunity
to inspect, and in all such contracts without express warranty, there was
an implied term that the article should be salable in the market under the
description mentioned. This was followed and elaborated upon in Jones v.
Just (1868) 3 Q. B. 197, in which the implied term was held to exist al-
though the defect in the goods was unknown to the seller and could not be
checked at the time of contracting.
85. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc. (1931) 255 N. Y. 388, 175
N. E. 105, 74 A. L. R. 339, allowed recovery under sec. 15 (2) of the Uni-
1948]
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has the effect, in the cases of sales of food, of the former warranty.'
The only exception arises when the buyer has examined the goods (food)
and failed to detect a patent defect.37
The question of the need for privity of contract also formulated an issue
on which the courts divided. Obviously privity of contract is not required
by those minority courts which sustain the theory that the warranty is
imposed by law to protect public health. 3S But privity of contract is neces-
sary to preserve legal symmetry in those majority courts which sustain
the "contractual warranty" theory. However, many of the courts follow-
ing the latter point of view have recognized the harshness of the require-
ment of privity and have allowed recovery when there is no direct con-
tractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant; they indulge in
fictions such as presumed negligence, fraud, assignment of cause of action
from dealer to consumer, third party beneficiary, and agency of buyer for
consumer. The most recent cases tend to disregard the requirement of
privity and hold the manufacturer liable directly to the ultimate consumer.
Missouri follows this recent trend.3 9
The Texas court in the principal case has adopted an historically logical
and commendable position regarding the nature of the implied warranty
in the sale of foods. Those courts which dogmatically sustain the "con-
tractual warranty" theory have been unfortunately slow in altering their
position. However, a clearer understanding of the history of the early
common law and an appreciation of its frequent misinterpretation by
American courts40 have been reflected in the Uniform Sales Act. As shown
above, the adoption of this statute has increased the scope of liability of
the seller; and because liability rests on the seller by reason of the early
common law, the warranty must surely arise by operation of law in the
interests of the public health and safety, rather than from the contractual
relationship. The true nature of the warranty is further revealed by the
fact that some courts indulge in fiction to escape privity of contract. This
is nothing more than an effort to effect absolute liability which was also
the objective of the early common law. These courts should come out and
say that liability is imposed by law as a matter of public policy.
R. S. K.
form Sales Act and gives the general rule of the United States and En-
gland.
36. See note 33, supra.
37. This is provided by see. 15(3) of the Uniform Sales Act.
38. The doctrine of privity of contract applies only when one seeks to
enforce a contract.
39. McNicholas v. Continental Baking Co. (Mo. App. 1938) 112 S. W.(2d) 849; Carter v. St. Louis Dairy Co. (Mo. App. 1940) 139 S. W. (2d)
1025; Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1936) 230 Mo. App.
275, 90 S. W. (2d) 445; Smith v. Carlos (1923) 215 Mo. App. 488, 247 S. W.
468, Helms v. General Baking Co. (Mo. 1942) 164 S. W. (2d) 150.
40. See discussion by Chief Judge Hobson of the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky in Walden v. Wheeler (1913) 153 Ky. 181, 154 S. W. 1088.
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